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INTRODUCTION
Private capital and technology play a central role in the
transition to a low-carbon economy.1 In the absence of an
international carbon price, the regulatory initiatives currently
used to stimulate the participation of private investors in this
transition are primarily directed at influencing the incomes of
investments. At the national level, states create support schemes
to enable the financial viability of low-carbon investments, such
as renewable energy projects, energy efficiency improvements,
and carbon capture and storage.2 At an international level, the
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol3—the Joint
Implementation (“JI”) and Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”)—provide low-carbon investors with an additional
income to cover the higher costs of greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emission reduction projects that would, in theory, not have been
realized without this support. Moreover, at national and
regional levels, emissions trading schemes positively influence
the financial viability of low-carbon investments by capping and
trading GHG emissions.4
The potential costs and revenues of a project, however, are
not the only considerations taken into account by investors.
Investment decisions are also influenced by risks of ex post
regulatory changes or interference by the state. Due to the
dependence on public support and other regulatory structures
that states create to internalize the carbon externality, lowcarbon investments are particularly vulnerable to regulatory
risks. Given the financial consequences of support policies for
the state budget and consumers, states may be tempted to
renege on promises of public support once the investments have

1. See Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, at 42 (2007).
2. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 295–96, 299
(2010) [hereinafter IEA].
3. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
4. See, e.g., Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the
Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. L 275/32.
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been made and costs are “sunk.”5 A perception amongst lowcarbon investors that the state might act opportunistically and
change the “rules of the game” requires them to factor in a risk
premium. Taking into account long-term and capital-intensive
nature of most low-carbon investments, it is reasonable to
assume that this perception of ex post public interference with
the financial basis of low-carbon investments will increase the
cost of climate policies. By contrast, economic and financial
theory would suggest that a guarantee of protection against
these risks may reduce the required returns and thus stimulate
these investments.6
The focus on the “‘income-side” of low-carbon investments
has taken attention away from the importance of the “risk-side”
of these investments. This contribution builds upon the idea
that, to promote low-carbon investments, “mitigating risk is
certainly an alternative to raising the level of compensation.”7
To be efficient, climate regulations need to be compatible with
the way private investors make their investment decisions and
must therefore reflect both the income and risk components of
low-carbon investments.
Despite the considerable importance of regulatory risks for
low-carbon investments, legal literature largely remains silent on
how to best protect low-carbon investors against the occurrence
of these risks. The debate on the interaction between investment
arbitration and climate law, for instance, almost exclusively
focuses on the potential constraining effect (“regulatory chill”)
that investment standards might have on states intending to
implement GHG emission reduction policies.8 The role that
5. See Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, Credible Carbon Policy, 19
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 438, 439–42 (2003).
6. See Catherine Mitchell, Dierk Bauknecht & Peter M. Connor, Effectiveness
through Risk Reduction: A Comparison of the Renewable Obligation in England and Wales and
the Feed-in System in Germany, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 297, 297 (2006); see also Dominique
Finon & Yannick Perez, The Social Efficiency of Instruments of Promotion of Renewable
Energies: A Transaction-cost Perspective, 62 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 77, 81, 86 (2007). On the
importance of regulatory stability and predictability for climate policies, see NICHOLAS
STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 325 (2006).
7. See Mitchell, Bauknecht & Connor, supra note 6, at 297 (quoting OLE LANGNISS
& PETER HELBY, FINANCING RENEWABLE ENERGY SYSTEMS 112 (1999)).
8. See, e.g., Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Markus Gehring, Trade and
Investment Implication of Carbon Trading for Sustainable Development, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 77, 88 (David Freestone &
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investment arbitration might play in reinforcing climate change
mitigation policies (i.e. investment arbitration as a “force for
good”) is only mentioned en passant.9
This Article examines whether investment arbitration could
complement the existing income-based approach of climate
policies with a risk-based approach and thus reinforce the
credibility and effectiveness of climate change mitigation efforts.
Indeed, international investment agreements (“IIAs”) aim to
protect foreign investors against public interference with the
financial and regulatory basis of their investments.10
International investment law is based on the necessity to reduce
noncommercial regulatory and political risks in order to
promote the inflow of foreign capital and technology.11 The
substantive investment standards that are generally contained in
IIAs include protection against expropriation, the provision of
fair and equitable treatment, and nondiscrimination and
umbrella (pacta sunt servanda) clauses. Are these international
investment protection standards capable of shielding low-carbon
investments against substantial change by host states in terms of
the support mechanisms that they create to attract such
Charlotte Streck eds., 2009); Lise Johnson, International Investment Agreements and
Climate Change: The Potential for Investor-State Conflicts and Possible Strategies for Minimizing
It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11147, 11150, 11153 (2009); Stephan W. Schill, Do Investment
Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate Change?, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 469,
470, 477 (2007); JACOB WERKSMAN, KEVIN A. BAUMERT & NAVROZ K. DUBASH, WORLD
RESOURCES INST., WILL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULES OBSTRUCT CLIMATE
PROTECTION POLICIES? 9 (2001), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/willinternational-investment-rules-obstruct-climate-protection-policies;
Kate
Miles,
International Investment Law and Climate Change: Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon
World 10, 22–25 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. L., Online Proceedings of the Inaugural
Conference, Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154588.
9. See Schill, supra note 8, at 477; see also FIONA MARSHALL, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:
OBSTACLES OR OPPORTUNITIES? 23–25, 79 (2010); Bradford S. Gentry & Jennifer J.
Ronk, International Investment Agreements and Investments in Renewable Energy, in FROM
BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITIES: RENEWABLE ENERGY ISSUES IN LAW AND POLICY 25, 71–73
(Leslie Parker et al. eds., 2007). But see Edna Sussman, The Energy Charter Treaty’s
Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote
Sustainable Development, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 391, 404 (2008).
10. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW passim (2008).
11. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND
RELATED DOCUMENTS: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
COOPERATION 14 (2004).
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investment? The answer to this question will determine the
ability of international investment law to contribute to the
international efforts required to combat climate change.12
In Part I, this Article briefly recalls the main regulatory
principles underlying the support mechanisms that states
develop to attract low-carbon investments and by highlighting
how states may interfere with promised support. Part II looks at
the regulatory risks in light of current arbitral practice. Whether
low-carbon investments would answer to the definition of
“investments” under international investment law is questioned
in Part II.A. Part II.B then analyzes the expropriation standard,
Part II.C considers the fair and equitable treatment standard,
Part II.D looks at the nondiscrimination principle, and Part II.E
examines umbrella clauses. Finally, Part II.F analyzes the extent
to which states could justify possible breaches of these
investment protection standards on the basis of public policy
objectives. Given that most GHG emission reductions will have
to take place in the energy sector, special attention is paid
throughout this Article to the energy-specific investment regime
of the Energy Charter Treaty.13
This Article demonstrates that investment arbitration
provides the necessary conceptual tools required to improve the
regulatory stability and predictability that is necessary for lowcarbon investment. It has the potential to protect low-carbon
investments against the risks of regulatory changes that can
affect climate policies. By providing these guarantees of stability,
investment arbitration can reinforce the credibility of climate
change mitigation policies. However, in the absence of a
doctrine of precedent in international investment law, lowcarbon investors have no certainty that arbitral tribunals will
follow an interpretative approach that adequately protects their

12. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE
MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: ANNEXES (2009) (statement of Alan Larson),
availabel at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm. For a general
discussion on the positive contribution of investment arbitration to environmental
goals, see Thomas Wälde, Investment Arbitration and Sustainable Development: Good
Intentions—or Effective Results?, 6 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 459, 460–62 (2006).
13. Energy Charter Treaty, 1994 O.J. L 380/24 [hereinafter Energy Charter
Treaty].
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investments. It is precisely this certainty that is needed to reduce
the costs of climate change mitigation policies.
Following the reasoning underlying the Energy Charter
Treaty, this Article examines the idea of creating a specific
investment treaty for climate change mitigation projects in Part
III. In Part IV, this Article proposes to integrate a low-carbon
specific investment protection regime in a new international
agreement on climate change. This approach would not require
the development of new investment disciplines, but could be
limited to an official endorsement of existing interpretative
approaches.
I. REGULATORY RISKS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
POLICIES14
A. Risks in the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol
The CDM, defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,
refers to the implementation of project activities that reduce
GHG emissions by Annex I parties (i.e. states with GHG
emission limits) or by subordinate legal entities in non-Annex I
parties.15 The emission credits generated by such projects are
known as Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”) and can be
used by Annex I parties to meet their emission reduction
targets.16 CDM project activities thus promote the transfer of
low-carbon technologies from industrialized countries to
developing countries.17
The CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board.18 This
international institution approves CDM projects and issues CERs
in accordance with the following procedure.19 First, since
14. This Part draws on Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International
Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.
333, 341–46 (2009).
15. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12; see Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani
Schmidt, CDM Project Cycle and the Role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 175, 175
(David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005).
16. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12(3)(b).
17. See Netto & Barani Schmidt, supra note 15, at 175.
18. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12(4).
19. See U.N. Envtl. Programme, CDM Information and Guidebook, at 48–49 (MyungKyoon Lee ed., 2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/cdm%
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participation in the CDM is voluntary, host states, as well as
home countries, have to endorse the project.20 States, the
Designated National Authority (“DNA”) in particular, generally
approve projects by signing so-called Letters of Approval.21
Second, the project participants have to prepare a Project
Design Document (“PDD”) outlining the technical design of the
project activity and determining its “additionality”22 in
comparison to what would occur without the project (“Business
as Usual”). The PDD has to be approved by a Designated
Operational Entity (“DOE”).23 Third, after being validated by a
DOE, the proposed project activity must be submitted for
registration by the CDM Executive Board.24 Once registered, the
project activity can be implemented and can begin to generate
emission reductions. Emissions reductions are calculated in
relation to a baseline representing the emissions that would
occur in a Business as Usual scenario. A DOE must
independently control the monitoring of the project activity and
certify the amount of emission reductions achieved. On the basis
of this certification, the CDM Executive Board issues a
corresponding amount of CERs.
JI, defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, refers to the
implementation by Annex I parties, or its legal entities, of
20guideline%202nd%20edition.pdf; see also Kati Kulovesi, The Private Sector and the
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and Prospects, 16 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 145, 147–48, 150–52 (2007); SIDS CDM Guide–The CDM:
Practical Details, FOUND. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L. & DEV., http://www.cdmguide.net/
cdm10.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). For an overview of the Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”) project cycle, see Netto & Barani Schmidt, supra note 15, at 186–
90.
20. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean
Development Mechanism as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, at 15, Decision
3/CMP.1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism].
21. See Robert O’Sullivan & Charles Cormier, Meeting Participating Country
Responsibilities Under the CDM: Designating a National Authority, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note
15, at 213, 223.
22. See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at
14–16.
23. The Designated Operational Entity is an accredited organization tasked with
the independent validation of proposed CDM project activities and verification of
emission reductions. See id. at 15.
24. See id.
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project activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other
Annex I parties.25 The emission credits generated by JI projects
are known as Emission Reduction Units (“ERUs”). If a host
party meets certain eligibility requirements,26 it may, under the
so-called “Track 1 procedure,” independently verify the
additionality of emission reductions and issue ERUs.27 ERUs are
issued in proportion to the amount of GHG emissions that the
project reduces in relation to a baseline.28 ERUs are generated
by converting Assigned Amount Units (“AAUs”).29 If a host party
does not meet these requirements, the “Track 2 procedure”
applies. Under this procedure, JI projects are, in a similar way to
the CDM project cycle, regulated by an international body—the
JI Supervisory Committee.30 It is also this institution that
approves projects and issues ERUs corresponding to the verified
emission reductions.31
The risk of the state interfering with the issuance of CERs
to CDM projects is relatively limited.32 Indeed, it is an
international institution—the CDM Executive Board—and not
host states that approve these projects and issue the GHG
emission credits.33 The same applies to projects implemented
under the JI “Track 2 procedure.”34
25. See Charlotte Streck, Joint Implementation: History, Requirements, and Challenges,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING
KYOTO WORK, supra note 15, at 107, 107–08.
26. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Guidelines for the Implementation of
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, at 6, Decision 9/CMP.1, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Guidelines for the
Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol].
27. See id. at 7.
28. See id. at 8, 12.
29. The allowances allocated to the Annex I parties corresponding to their
greenhouse gas emission limits.
30. See Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26,
at 7.
31. See id. at 7–9.
32. See Jolene Lin & Charlotte Streck, Mobilising Finance for Climate Change
Mitigation: Private Sector Involvement in International Carbon Finance Mechanisms, 10 MELB.
J. INT’L L. 70, 74–75 (2009).
33. See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at
14, 19.
34. See Sander Simonetti, Legal Protection and (the Lack of) Private Party Remedies in
International Carbon Emission Reduction Projects, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 171,
179 (2009). The risks related to the issuance of emission credits by the CDM Executive
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Nevertheless, in theory, host states could detrimentally
affect the investors concerned by exercising influence on the
entities (i.e. DOE or Accredited Independant Entity) that are in
charge of verifying the emission reductions.35 This could have an
impact on the amount of emission reductions that are certified
as having been achieved by the project activity. This, in turn,
would affect the amount of CERs and ERUs issued. Host country
pressure on the DOE could also affect the renewal of the project
beyond the first crediting period, that is beyond the first span of
time during which the host country issues ERUs.
The risks to JI projects implemented under the “Track 1
procedure” may be more important. Under this procedure, the
discretionary power of the host country is much broader due to
the country’s central role in the issuance of ERUs.36 Host states
may, for instance, refuse to issue or transfer ERUs to private
foreign investors notwithstanding their commitments as
contained in the Letter of Approval.37 Host states may be
tempted to do so in order to avoid reducing the amount of
AAUs available to meet international emission reduction
obligations. Host states might also influence the issuance of
ERUs by imposing changes to the baseline that is used to
calculate emission reductions, or simply by withdrawing the
approval of a JI project and thus its eligibility to receive ERUs.38
Investors could also face the risk of nationalization of their
investment.39
Board and the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee are excluded from the
scope of this paper. See Lin & Streck, supra note 32, at 73, 77–78.
35. See Dane Ratliff, Arbitration in ‘Flexible-Mechanism’ Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra
note 15, at 377, 383 n.23.
36. See Streck, supra note 25, at 112.
37. See Anikó Pogány, Negotiating a JI Contract: A Project Developer’s Perspective, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO
WORK, supra note 15, at 329, 331.
38. See Chester Brown, International, Mixed, and Private Disputes Arising Under the
Kyoto Protocol, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 447, 471 (2010); Charlotte Streck, World
Bank Carbon Finance Business: Contracts and Emission Reductions Purchase Transactions, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO
WORK, supra note 15, at 355, 369.
39. See Julian Richardson, Carbon Markets, in COPING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE:
RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS ch. 17, 13–14 (Chartered Ins. Inst. ed., 2009),
available at http://www.cii.co.uk/pages/research/climatechangereport.aspx (select
“Chapter 17” hyperlink); see also Chester Brown, The Settlement of Disputes Arising in
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B. Risks in National Support Schemes
National support for renewable energy sources, energy
efficiency improvements, or other types of low-carbon
investment is often granted by creating a system of “green
certificates” (or “white certificates”), “feed-in tariffs,”
“premiums,” or by granting investment aid or fiscal advantages
to electricity producers using renewable energy sources.40
Usually, “green certificate” schemes are arranged in such a
way that regulatory authorities deliver tradable certificates for a
certain amount of electricity generated from renewable energy
sources.41 The value of such certificates is created by obliging
electricity suppliers to submit a certain amount of certificates to
the regulatory authorities.42 This amount is generally
determined in proportion to the producers’ supplies of
electricity to end consumers.43 Suppliers that fail to meet this
quota-obligation are fined.44 A secondary market for certificates
is created where eligible producers and suppliers with too many
certificates can sell their certificates to other market players.45
With “feed-in tariff” schemes, the electricity produced from
renewable energy installations is paid at a fixed minimum
price.46 This minimum purchase price is generally set higher
than the market price and guaranteed over a specified

Flexibility Mechanism Transactions Under the Kyoto Protocol, 21 ARB. INT’L 361, 380 (2005);
MIRJAM HARMELINK & PAUL SOFFE, FINANCING AND FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION (JI) PROJECTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 34, 59 (2001).
40. For an overview of the support schemes adopted by the European Union
(“EU”) Member States, see Commission of the European Communities, The
Renewable Energy Progress Report: Commission Report in Accordance with Article 3
of Directive 2001/77/EC, Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/30/EC and on the
Implementation of the EU Biomass Action Plan, COM (2009) 192 Final, at 6–7 (Apr.
2009), and the Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the
Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, COM (2005) 627 Final, at 4–5
(Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Commission Communication Dec. 2005].
41. See N.H. VAN DER LINDEN ET AL., REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH
RENEWABLE ENERGY OBLIGATION SUPPORT MECHANISMS 10–11 (2005).
42. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 4.
43. See VAN DER LINDEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 10.
44. See DAVID DE JAGER & MAX RATHMANN, POLICY INSTRUMENT DESIGN TO
REDUCE FINANCING COSTS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS 38 (2008).
45. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 5.
46. See id. at 4.

2012]

COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE

623

duration.47 Usually, this fixed price is combined with a purchase
obligation for electricity suppliers or network companies.48
The difference between a “feed-in tariff” and “premium”
schemes is that the latter involves a premium being applied on
the electricity market price, whereas feed-in tariffs entitle
producers to one, all-inclusive, and specific price.49 In premium
schemes, the amount of support paid to the producers fluctuates
with the price of electricity on the wholesale market.50
The experience gathered regarding the implementation of
support schemes suggests that states might easily succumb to the
temptation of interfering with the amount and duration of
support.51 Recent analyses on the effectiveness of support
schemes for renewable energy implemented in the European
Union (“EU”), for instance, show that Member States have
introduced fundamental changes to their policy frameworks.52
These changes have jeopardized the credibility of renewable
energy policies and generated high investment uncertainty.53

47. See JOAN CANTON & ÅSA JOHANNESSON LINDÉN, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, ECON. PAPERS NO.
408, KC-AI-10-408-EN-N, Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the EU 7 (2010).
48. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 5.
49. See id.
50. See CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDÉN, supra note 47, at 9.
51. See Ryan Katofsky & Lisa Frantzis, Financing Renewables in Competitive Electricity
Markets, 109 POWER ENGINEERING 76, 76 (2005).
52. See, e.g., MARIO RAGWITZ ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSPORT, INTELLIGENT ENERGY FOR EUROPE PROGRAMME,
ASSESSMENT AND OPTIMIZATION OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES SUPPORT SCHEMES IN THE
EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET: FINAL REPORT 19–21 (2007); IEA, supra note 2, at 319;
Gerard Marata et al., Renewable Energy Incentives in the United States and Spain: Different
Paths—Same Destination?, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 481, 498–99 (2010); Letter
from Ole Beier Sørensen, Chairman, Institutional Investors Grp. on Climate Change, &
Chief of Strategy & Analysis, ATP, to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, President of Spain
(June 23, 2010), available at http://www.iigcc.org/data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1009/
IIGCC-letter-to-Spanish-government.pdf (describing the Proposed Retroactive
Reduction of 661 Tariff for Existing Investments in Spain).
53. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Energy 2020: A Strategy
for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy, COM (2010) 639 Final, at 9 (Nov.
2010) [hereinafter Commission Communication Nov. 2010]; International PV Investors
Demand Compensation or Repeal for Retroactive Spanish PV Tariff Changes Under
International Investment Treaty, NA PRESSEPORTAL, Mar. 8, 2011, www.presseportal.de/
pm/78742/2004299/white_owl_capital_ag.
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Commentators highlight the fact that the austerity
measures being introduced to cut budget deficits in Europe will
affect the support for renewable energy.54 Indeed, subsidies for
renewable energy are often considered “an easy target in times
of crisis.”55 The problem is not just that governments “will
reduce subsidies for new projects. The industry regards cuts as
inevitable . . . . More serious is the fear that [governments] will
cut agreed subsidies for projects built or under construction.”56
The European experience shows that investment
uncertainty resulting from the risk of cuts has a very negative
effect on the development of renewable energy.57 This can be
explained by the fact that, from an investor’s perspective, “a
financial change of the support system is considered the most
important risk factor” for investments in renewable energy.58
This is because the level of support is the most important
element influencing expected profit.59
The success of support schemes for renewable energy thus
depends on the “credibility of the public authority’s long-term
commitment.”60 Gaining this credibility by minimizing investors’
expectations of ex post regulatory adjustments is, however, a
difficult task. The risk is that, once investments are made, the
public authorities will be tempted to reconsider their
commitments.61 Indeed, according to Dominique Finon and
Yannick Perez:
The public authority is not committed in the regulatory
contract as much as the developers-operators who invest
money in [renewable energy sources] RES-E projects; this
opens the door to discretionary changes in the contract.
The possible government’s opportunism, exerted in
unforeseeable amendments of the design of the instruments
or by willing to change the instrument, creates a risk of
54. See, e.g., Victor Mallet, Shadow Falls Across Spanish Solar Energy Industry, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 1, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/275db4d0-6cdf-11df-91c800144feab49a.html; see also Marata et al., supra note 52, at 498–99.
55. See Mallet, supra note 54.
56. Id.; see Marata et al., supra note 52, at 498–99.
57. See Commission Communication Nov. 2010, supra note 53, at 9.
58. RAGWITZ ET AL., supra note 52, at 177–78; see Commission Communication
Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 16–17.
59. See RAGWITZ ET AL., supra note 52, at 178.
60. Finon & Perez, supra note 6, at 83.
61. See Helm, Hepburn & Mash, supra note 5, at 440.
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expropriation of quasi-rents on existing RES-E plants or
current RES-E investments, and this risk can be a strong
deterrent against investing in RES-E.62

The authorities could, for instance, withdraw the promised
support or shorten its duration. They could refuse to pay or
diminish the amount of support. In countries with green
certificate schemes, the host country could refuse to issue the
certificates or issue fewer certificates than those expected under
the rules existing at the moment of investment. The host
country could also reduce the quota and thereby depress the
price for green certificates.
Investments in energy efficiency improvements made on
the basis of “white” certificates or feed-in tariffs, and investments
in carbon capture and storage based on public support, face
similar risks.
II. PROTECTION OF LOW-CARBON INVESTMENTS UNDER
EXISTING IIAS
A. Low-Carbon Investments as “Investments” Protected by IIAs
To be protected under international investment law, lowcarbon investments should qualify as “investments” within the
meaning of the applicable IIAs.63 Arbitral practice developed on
the basis of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States64 defines
an “investment” on the basis of four criteria (the so-called Salini
test): contributions by the investor, certain duration of
performance, the existence of operational risks, and the
contribution to the economic development of the host state.65
62. Finon & Perez, supra note 6, at 83; see Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff,
Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power
Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1861 (2008); Angus Johnston, Amalia Kavali
& Karsten Neuhoff, Take-or-Pay Contracts for Renewables Deployment, 36 ENERGY POL’Y
2481, 2482 (2008).
63. See Freya Baetens, The Kyoto Protocol in Investor-State Arbitration: Reconciling
Climate Change and Investment Protection Objectives, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 683, 693 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011).
64. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 1, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270; 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
65. See Salini Costrutorri S.P.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004); see
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Most low-carbon investments are likely to fulfill the Salini
criteria.66 Indeed, investments in renewable energy or other lowcarbon technologies are generally characterized by their high
capital intensity and long term pay-back period. The high costs
and social relevance (e.g. for energy supply) of these
investments expose them to considerable economic, financial,
and political risk.67 Finally, it cannot be doubted that low-carbon
projects, particularly those in the energy industry, are important
for the development of the national economy.
The Energy Charter Treaty investment regime is limited to
“any investment associated with an ‘economic activity in the
energy sector.’”68 Renewable energy projects fall within this
scope. Indeed, the Final Act of the European Energy Charter
Conference specifies that renewable energy sources are
“illustrative of Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.”69
The same conclusion applies to energy efficiency
improvement projects. Energy efficiency measures apply to the
production, transmission, distribution, or sale of energy
products.70 These measures are by definition associated with the
energy sector. Moreover, the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects considers energy
savings to be a “source of energy”71—the so-called “fifth energy
source” besides natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium. Energy
efficiency investments that lead to energy savings could
therefore be considered as an economic activity related to the
exploitation of this “fifth” source of energy.
Given the intrinsic relationship between GHG emissions
and the energy sector, most other low-carbon investments are
also likely to fall within the scope of the Energy Charter Treaty’s
also Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 43 (July 11, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002).
66. On the application of the Salini test to energy investments in general, see
Anna Turinov, ‘Investment’ and ‘Investor’ in Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration: Uncertain
Jurisdiction, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 1 (2009).
67. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2008:
Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, at 164, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2008 (Sept. 24, 2008).
68. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 13, art. 1(6), at 25.
69. ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 11, at 25.
70. See Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental
Aspects, 1994 O.J. L 380/92, arts. 2(4), 3(4), at 92–93.
71. See id. art. 1(1), at 92.
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application. The Energy Charter secretariat considers that
carbon capture and storage is part of the “energy cycle.”72
Carbon dioxide capture, its transportation by pipelines, and its
storage can, according to the Energy Charter secretariat, be
certified as being “Economic Activities in the Energy Sector.”73
More generally, the secretariat argues that “[carbon dioxide]
may be taken within the coverage of the term ‘energy related
activity.’”74
A more delicate issue is whether the rights associated with
low-carbon investment—i.e. the right to benefit from support
for renewable energy or the right to receive CERs or ERUs—
could qualify as “investments” within the meaning of IIAs.75 In
their definition of “investment,” many IIAs include “rights
conferred by law or contract.”76 Arbitral tribunals77 and leading
commentators78 have consistently ruled that contractual and
regulatory rights can qualify as “investments,” and that they are
capable of expropriation. Investors in renewable energy projects
and in JI and CDM projects generally hold contractual and
regulatory rights to benefit from support.79 For renewable
72. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, INVESTMENT AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT
IN CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: ROLE OF THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 29 (2009).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 8.
75. See Jennifer Morgan, Note, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and
Opportunities for Investors, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 173 (2006).
76. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 13, arts. 1(6)(c), 1(6)(f); see also
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 60; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 173 (2007).
77. See Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Republic of Taj., Case No. V/064/2008,
Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 139 (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/Al-BahloulvTajikistan_PartialAward_2Sep
2009.pdf [hereinafter Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul]; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve
Sanayi A.Ş. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 456
(Aug. 27, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf; Compañía de
Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award,
¶¶ 7.5.2, 7.5.4 (Aug. 20, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/VivendiAward
English.pdf [hereinafter Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija].
78. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Taking of Property,
at 36, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (2000).
79. See Streck, supra note 38, at 359–60; see also Anatole Boute, The Protection of
Property Rights Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Promotion of LowCarbon Investments, 1 CLIMATE L. 93, 108–13 (2010); Johnston, Kavali & Neuhoff, supra
note 62, at 2486, 2497; Matthieu Wemaere & Charlotte Streck, Legal Ownership and
Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allowances, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note 15, at 35, 43–44.
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energy projects, these rights result from agreements that
investors conclude with the national public authorities in charge
of the implementation of the national support schemes for
renewable energy.80 These agreements concern, for example,
the certification of renewable energy installations or the
issuance of renewable energy certificates that entitle the
operators of eligible installations to public support.81 Regulatory
rights are derived from the national regulatory framework that
governs the support of renewable energy sources.82 Similarly, the
implementation of JI and CDM projects involve the conclusion
of agreements that formalize the host state’s approval of the
projects (“Letters of Approval”).83 These agreements also
provide the investors with contractual claims regarding the
future issuance or transfer of ERUs or CERs.84 Moreover,
national regulations governing the implementation of JI projects
confer upon investors that fulfill all procedural criteria the
regulatory right to receive ERUs. It is arguable that the
contractual and regulatory right to benefit from support
schemes and to receive CERs or ERUs would come within the
broad ambit of “investments” as understood in arbitral
practice.85
80. See Department of Energy and Climate Change, Planning Our Electric Future:
A White Paper for Secure, Affordable and Low-Carbon Electricity, 2011, Cm. 8099, at 7,
37 (U.K.), available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/
white_papers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_2011.aspx [hereinafter Planning Our Electric
Future].
81. See ASSOCIATION OF ISSUING BODIES, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF OPERATION
FOR THE EUROPEAN ENERGY CERTIFICATE SYSTEM 4, 5 (2011) available at
http://www.aib-net.org/portal/page/portal/AIB_HOME/AIB_OPE/EECS/EECS_
Rules/EECS%20Rules%20Release%207.pdf; see also STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS
TEMPLATE BETWEEN [THE SCHEME MEMBER] AND [THE MARKET PARTICIPANT] 1–2
(2011), available at http://www.aib-net.org/portal/page/portal/AIB_HOME/AIB_
OPE/EECS/Standard%20Terms%20%20Conditions/STC%20Template%
20Release%203.0.pdf.
82. See Boute, supra note 79, at 109–10.
83. See O’Sullivan & Cormier, supra note 21, at 223.
84. See Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19.
85. See Morgan, supra note 75, at 173–74; see also Lisa Bennett, Note, Are Tradable
Carbon Emissions Credits Investments? Characterization and Ramifications Under International
Investment Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1581, 1590–99 (2010). More generally, on the
qualification of greenhouse gas emission credits as “possessions” or property, see Harro
van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and the Rule of
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 337 (2009); Erich Vranes,
Climate Change and the WTO: EU Emission Trading and the WTO Disciplines on Trade in
Goods, Services and Investment Protection, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 707, 716–18 (2009).

2012]

COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE

629

The classification of regulatory and contractual rights
relative to the financial support of low-carbon investments as
“investments” has the effect of bringing these rights within the
ambit of protection afforded by IIAs. It does not, however,
necessarily mean that these rights are individually protected
under the investment disciplines of these IIAs.
Arbitral tribunals are reluctant to isolate particular
elements of a larger investment operation and qualify these
elements as separate investments that would benefit from
individual protection.86 This is in accordance with the “totality of
rights,” “indivisible whole,” or “general unity of an investment
operation” theories. Under these theories, a claim that “forms
part of a larger series of transactions would not on its own
qualify as an investment.”87 IIAs, therefore, do not separately
protect the individual rights associated with an investment
transaction. IIAs only protect the general investment itself.
Allegations of expropriation, for instance, are assessed on the
basis of the impact that the contested measures will have on the
general investment, not on the potential destruction or
deprivation of individual rights associated with this general
investment.
Some arbitral tribunals have nevertheless accepted that
specific rights associated with a general investment transaction
can individually qualify as investments.88 These tribunals justified
this approach by highlighting the importance of these specific
rights for the making of the general investment. In Eureko, the
tribunal argued that “since the grant to Eureko of [these
specific] rights . . . was a key element of the investment, without
which it appears that there would have been no investment at
86. See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human
Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE
RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 743, 760 (Stephan Breitenmoser et
al. eds., 2007).
87. Id. For an application of this theory, see Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P.
v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Jan. 14,
2004), http://www.asil.org/ilib/Enron.pdf [hereinafter Enron]; Československá
Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (May 24, 1999), 38 I.L.M. 1708 (1999).
88. See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77, ¶¶ 5.3.9–.10, 7.5.11,
7.5.25–.26; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., 12 ICSID Rep. 335, ¶ 144 (UNCITRAL Arb.
2005) [hereinafter Eureko]; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech, 9 ICSID Rep. 121,
¶¶ 376, 384 (UNCITRAL Arb. 2001) [hereinafter CME Czech Republic].
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all, the Tribunal concludes that those rights have some
economic value and are entitled to protection under the
Treaty.”89
The specific rights were “critical” to the making of the
general investment.90 The arbitral tribunals were therefore
willing to “unbundle”91 the general investment transaction in
specific investments to protect specific rights individually under
the investment disciplines of the applicable IIA.
Given the absence of an international carbon price, the
provision of additional financial support is often an essential
precondition—or “key element”—for the making of low-carbon
investments. Support under the JI and CDM mechanisms, for
instance, depends on the investment “additionality” of the
proposed projects.92 Project participants must not only
demonstrate that their investments will reduce GHG emissions
in relation to Business as Usual, but they must also prove that
the financial viability or financial attractiveness of their activity
depends on additional support provided by ERUs and CERs.93 In
theory therefore, the financial support represented by these
GHG emission credits constitutes a critical part of the economic
foundation of the investment. By the same token, the lack of
internalization of the carbon externality in electricity prices, and
the relatively high investment cost of renewable energy
installations in comparison to traditional power plants, result in
these investments being, for the moment, dependent on public
support. Following the award reasoning in Eureko, the
contractual and regulatory right to benefit from support could
thus qualify as a specific “investment” entitled to individual
protection under the applicable IIA.
89. Eureko, supra note 88, ¶ 145 (emphasis added); see Middle East Cement
Shipping & Handling Co., S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6,
Award, ¶¶ 100–01, 135–38 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 173 (2005) [hereinafter
Middle East Cement].
90. See Eureko, supra note 88, ¶¶ 144–45.
91. On the notion of “unbundling” or “dissection” of property rights in the
context of international investment law, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 371–72 (3d ed. 2010).
92. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6(1), 12(5)(c); Modalities and Procedures
for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at 14–16.
93. See CDM Executive Board 39, Methodological Tool: Tool for the Demonstration and
Assessment of Additionality (Version 05.2), at 5, Annex 10 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-01-v5.2.pdf.

2012]

COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE

631

The approach followed by the Eureko tribunal offers
considerable protection to investors that base their general
investment decisions on specific contractual and regulatory
rights, such as investors in renewable energy or in JI and CDM
projects. M. Sornarajah argues that:
From the point of view of property protection, the abstract
notion of property as a series of intangible rights has a
positive effect in that it makes it easier to protect contractual
rights . . . . A complete range of possible uses of property is
covered through an unbundling and spelling out of the
package of rights that previously constituted a single
bundle . . . . One could argue that a series of property rights
is spelt out and that impairment of any of those property
rights could amount to a taking.94

However, as mentioned above, the approach followed by the
Eureko tribunal is an exception to the theory of “general unity of
an investment operation.”95 Investors have no guarantee that
arbitral tribunals would accept the “unbundl[ing]” of a general
investment transaction in a series of individual rights, and grant
these rights separate protection under the investment
disciplines of the applicable IIA.
B. Withdrawal of Support as Partial Expropriation
Withdrawing support for low-carbon investment nullifies an
investor’s rights to benefit from this support. Could the affected
investors argue that such interference with their rights
constitutes a measure tantamount to expropriation? Could
investors in JI projects argue that a state’s refusal to issue or
transfer ERUs qualifies as an expropriation of their right to
receive these emission credits? Could CDM project participants
successfully invoke the expropriation standard against public
interference with CERs?
In accordance with established arbitral practice, the
threshold that must be reached before an action amounts to an
expropriation is high. Measures must have a substantial impact
on the economic benefit and value of the investment

94. SORNARAJAH, supra note 91, at 371–72.
95. Enron, supra note 87, ¶ 70; see Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 86, at 761.
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concerned.96 They must “radically deprive[] [the claimant] of
the economic use and enjoyment of its investment,”97
“effectively neutralize the benefit of the [claimant’s]
property,”98 “render [the claimant’s property] rights []
useless,”99 or “have a similar dispossessory effect.”100
Expropriation therefore results from actions that deprive the
investor of full ownership and control of the investment.101
State interference with the support for low-carbon
investment is unlikely to destroy the economic value of the
overall investment or deprive investors of full ownership and
control of their assets. Even if the support for renewable energy
is entirely cancelled, investors are still in control of their
installations. They continue to receive revenues for the
electricity produced and sold on the market. Similarly, a state’s
refusal to issue ERUs does not render an investor’s property
rights in the overall JI investment useless. Public interference
with CERs does not radically deprive CDM investors of the
economic use of their investments. Indeed, for projects
benefiting from support under the flexible mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol, “[i]ncome from the sale of carbon credits
usually makes up only a portion of the overall project budget,
meaning that project owners also need other sources of
financing to carry out their plans.”102 The protection of lowcarbon investors under the expropriation standard would
therefore depend on whether the right to receive support
96. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 101; see also L. Yves Fortier &
Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It
When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 293, 305
(2004).
97. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 115 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004)
[hereinafter Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed]; see Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa
Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶ 77
(Feb. 17, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 157 (2002).
98. CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶ 150.
99. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
122, ¶ 2 (1983).
100. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77, ¶ 7.5.24; see also National Grid
P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, Case No. 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award, ¶ 149 (UNCITRAL Arb.
2008), http://italaw.com/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf.
101. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 40 I.L.M. 258, ¶ 100
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2000) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot].
102. Kulovesi, supra note 19, at 150.
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constitutes a specific investment that is protected independently
from the impact on the overall investment.
As mentioned above, most arbitral tribunals opt to follow
the theory of “the general unity of an investment operation.”103
In accordance with this theory, these tribunals refuse to qualify
measures that destroy specific rights as expropriation when the
investors remain in control of the overall investment to which
these rights are associated.104 In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic and in Occidental Exploration and Production Co.
v. Republic of Ecuador, for instance, each tribunal “rejected the
possibility that an investment can be disassembled into a
number of discrete rights, each of which is capable of being
expropriated independently of the overall investment.”105 The
tribunal reached that conclusion despite the fact that the
applicable IIAs included “any right deferred by law or contract”
within the definition of an investment.106
In Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co., S.A. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, by contrast, the tribunal chose to examine
specific rights and assets separately under the expropriation
clause.107 Having analyzed whether each individual right met the
definition of “investment” outlined in the applicable IIA,108 the
tribunal examined whether the host state had deprived the
investor of the value of each specific right independently of the
impact on the overall investment.109 The tribunal in Eureko B.V.

103. See, e.g., Enron, supra note 87, ¶ 70; Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 87, at
760–71.
104. See Ursula Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE
69, 73–78 (2007); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 107.
105. Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 74; see CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 263–64 (May 12, 2005),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=s
howDoc&docId=DC504_En&caseId=C4 [hereinafter CMS Gas Transmission];
Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Final Award, 43
I.L.M. 1248, ¶¶ 86–89 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. 2004).
106. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. 1(a)(v), Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15
(1993) (entered into force May 11, 1997); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. 1(a)(v), Nov. 14, 1991, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993) (entered into force Oct. 20, 1994).
107. See Middle East Cement, supra note 89, ¶¶ 107, 143–44.
108. See id. ¶¶ 100–01, 135–38.
109. See id. ¶¶ 107, 143–44.
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v. Poland followed a similar approach.110 Although it explicitly
acknowledged that the contested measure did not affect the
basic investment, it ruled that the host state had expropriated
the specific rights—“key elements”—associated with this
investment.111 According to Ursula Kriebaum, the Eureko award
“demonstrates that even in a situation where the basic
investment remains unaffected, the deprivation of contract
rights that are related to the basic investment may amount to a
taking.”112
Other awards have followed an intermediary approach. In
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, the tribunal accepted
that the specific rights in question were covered by the
definition of investment and could accordingly be
expropriated.113 However, in contrast to the Middle East Cement
and Eureko awards, the tribunal ruled that the measure
amounted to an expropriation because it “destroyed . . . the
commercial value of the investment.”114
Reflecting on the Middle East Cement, Eureko, and CME
cases, Kriebaum argues that determining whether a “right is
capable of economic exploitation independently of the
remainder of the investment” is an important criterion in
assessing a specific right, in isolation from the overall
investment, under the expropriation standard.115 Specific rights
will be protected individually against expropriation if these
rights are “key elements” of an investment and can be exploited
separately from the rest of the investment.116 According to
Kriebaum, if these criteria are met, interference with such
specific rights could constitute a “partial expropriation” that
would violate the expropriation standard.117
ERUs and CERs have an intrinsic economic value. They can
be sold independently on the international carbon market.118 It
110. See Eureko, supra note 88, ¶ 145.
111. See id.
112. See Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 81.
113. See CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶¶ 376, 384.
114. See id. ¶ 591; see also Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77,
¶¶ 7.5.25–.26.
115. See Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 83.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Wemaere & Streck, supra note 79, at 36.
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is arguable that they constitute a “right [that] is capable of
economic exploitation independently of the remainder of the
investment.”119 They could, therefore, be subject to partial
expropriation.
Qualifying support schemes for renewable energy as
independent economic rights is less straightforward. “Green
certificates” are usually tradable on a secondary market where
they can be sold independently from the overall investment.
Green certificates could, therefore, qualify as individual
investments that could be subject to partial expropriation.
However, “feed-in tariffs” or “premium schemes” entitle the
operators of renewable energy installations to fixed prices.120
This fixed support usually may not be traded independently
from the main electricity transaction.121 Feed-in tariffs and
premium schemes, therefore, cannot be considered capable of
independent economic exploitation. In accordance with current
arbitral practice, investors will find it more challenging to
successfully invoke the expropriation standard against state
interference with feed-in tariffs and premium schemes than
against state interference with green certificates.
C. Protection Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
It is generally accepted that the fair and equitable
treatment standard requires the host state to observe the “basic
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investors to make the investment.”122 An investor’s legitimate
expectations must be based on “representations, commitments
or specific conditions offered by the State concerned”123 and
119. Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 83.
120. See id.
121. See id. (describing how feed-in tariffs consist as part of a “total price per unit
of electricity paid to the producers”).
122. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Investment
Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law 15–16 (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice N.Y.U.
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 6, 2006) (quoting Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed,
supra note 97, ¶ 154); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 124, 127,
130 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
123. National Grid P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, Case No. 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award,
¶ 173 (UNCITRAL Arb. 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf; see
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
¶ 331 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Pakerings.pdf [hereinafter
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relied upon by the investor in making the investment.124 Arbitral
tribunals pay particular attention to the conditions that the host
state proposes and the promises it makes to attract foreign
investors. In Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, for
instance, the tribunal considered that the requirement not to
affect the basic expectations taken into account by the investor
to make its investment “becomes particularly meaningful when
the investment has been attracted and induced by means of
assurances and representations . . . .”125 In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v.
United States, the tribunal specified that a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard may be exhibited by “the creation
by the State of objective expectations in order to induce
investment and the subsequent repudiation of those
expectations.”126 In CME Czech Republic, the tribunal considered
that the host state breached its obligation of fair and equitable
treatment by “evisceration of the arrangements in reliance upon
with [sic] the foreign investor was induced to invest.”127
W. Michael Reisman and Mahnoush Arsanjani argue that:
“Where a host State which seeks foreign investment acts
intentionally, so as to create expectations in potential investors
with respect to particular treatment or comportment, the host

Parkerings]; Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 45 I.L.M. 792,
¶ 147 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2006).
124. See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 154; see also Eureko,
supra note 88, ¶ 235. On the importance of investors’ reliance on expectations to make
their investment decisions, see Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, supra note 77, ¶¶ 199–
217.
125. See Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, ¶ 298 (Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694_En&caseId=C8
[hereinafter Sempra]. The Sempra award has been nullified by the decision of the ad
hoc committee of June 29, 2010 on the Argentine Republic’s Application for
Annulment of the award. The ad hoc committee did not, however, criticize the Sempra
tribunal’s interpretation and application of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
It nullified the award based on a manifest excess of power in the application of the
emergency exception of the applicable bilateral investment treaty. See Sempra Energy
Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Proceeding, ¶ 223
(June 29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8.
126. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 620–21, 627
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
125798.pdf.
127. See CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶ 611.
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state should . . . be bound by the commitments and the investor
is entitled to rely upon them in instances of decision.”128
Support schemes for renewable energy create incentives
that aim to stimulate private investment in the development of
renewable energy.129 Similarly, national regulatory frameworks
that govern JI projects aim to attract investment in GHG
emission reduction projects to the benefit of the national
economy.130 Low-carbon investors build their business cases on
the basis of these policies and promises of support.131 They
invest in reliance upon the faithful implementation of support
commitments made by host states.132 Investors in renewable
energy expect to receive public support in accordance with the
schemes existing at the time of investing.133 Participants in JI
projects meanwhile count on an amount of ERUs corresponding
to the verified emission reductions that are generated by their
approved projects.134
Given the lack of internalization of the carbon externality,
public support is a conditio sine qua non of a low-carbon
investment.135 It is often the “essential foundation for the
128. W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral
Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes, in COMMON VALUES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 409, 422 (PierreMarie Dupuy ed., 2006).
129. See IEA, supra note 2, at 293.
130. See Streck, supra note 25, at 107.
131. See, e.g., Planning Our Electric Future, supra note 80, at 34; DEP’T OF ENERGY
& CLIMATE CHANGE, UK RENEWABLE ENERGY ROADMAP 27 (2011) (U.K.), available at
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/renewable-energy/
2167-uk-renewable-energy-roadmap.pdf; Helm, Hepburn & Mash, supra note 5, at 439.
132. See DE JAGER & RATHMANN, supra note 44, at 10–11.
133. See id. at 15–32, 119; DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY TRACKER: AN INVESTOR’S ASSESSMENT 11–12 (2009), available
at
http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/Global_Climate_Change_Policy_
Tracker_Exec_Summary.pdf.
134. Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19.
135. According to Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb, and Michael Pollitt, “[p]ublic
support for the . . . development and deployment of new technologies and industries to
reduce emissions is vital.” Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, A LowCarbon Electricity Sector for the UK: Issues and Options, in DELIVERING A LOW-CARBON
ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: TECHNOLOGIES, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 278, 300 (Michael Grubb
et al. eds., 2008); see IEA, supra note 2, at 277; Letter from Institutional Investors Grp.
on Climate Change, to D. José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on the Proposed Retroactive
Reduction of 661 Tariff for Existing Investments (June 23, 2010), available at
http://www.iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1009/IIGCC-letter-to-Spanishgovernment.pdf; MARIO RAGWITZ ET AL., ASSESSMENTS AND OPTIMISATION OF
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investment—without it, it [the investment] could not survive
economically.”136 The fair and equitable treatment standard
could therefore provide important guarantees of protection
against eviscerations by the state on the arrangements it has
made to attract low-carbon investments. According to the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the fair
and equitable treatment standard “could be used to challenge
the refusal of expected government support [and] the
dismantling of market-creating mechanisms.”137
The pre-investment legal order does not only form the
framework for the positive reach of investors’ expectations. It
also provides “the scope of considerations upon which the host
state is entitled to rely when it defends against subsequent claims
of the foreign investor.”138 In the design of national JI
regulations, states often aim to retain a degree of discretion to
issue and discontinue ERUs.139 According to Werksman,
“[w]hen establishing emissions allowance and offset schemes at
the domestic level, government authorities have been careful to
avoid any legal characterization that these instruments can
provide the basis for legal entitlements or property rights.”140
Similarly, states can maintain a degree of regulatory discretion
in the design of support schemes for renewable energy sources
by stipulating that the amount and duration of support will be
subject to revisions.141 Are such “waiver clauses” sufficient to

RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT SCHEMES IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET: FINAL
REPORT
178
(Intelligent
Energy
Eur.
ed.,
2007),
available
at
http://www.optres.fhg.de/OPTRES_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.
136. Thomas Wälde & Kaj Hobér, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award,
22 J. INT’L ARB. 83, 98 (2005).
137. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010:
Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, at 137, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22,
2010) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2010].
138. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment
Treaties, 39 INT’L L. 87, 103 (2005); see also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES 232 (2010).
139. Jacob D. Werksman, Defending the “Legitimate Expectations” of Privates Investors
Under the Climate Change Regime: In Search of a Legal Theory for Redress, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L.
679, 690 (2008).
140. Id. at 689.
141. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/96/EC on Restructuring the Community
Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity, 2003 O.J. L 283/51,
art. 16(3), at 57 [hereinafter Restructuring the Community Framework Directive].
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prevent the creation of legitimate expectations protected under
the fair and equitable treatment standard?
The Court of Justice for the European Union was
confronted with a similar question. This question arose in the
context of a claim challenging the withdrawal of a support
scheme for renewable energy under the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations in EU law.142 Plantanol—a
German manufacturer of biofuel—complained that, by
withdrawing a tax exemption scheme that was aimed at
promoting the use of biofuel in the transport sector, Germany
had violated Plantanol’s legitimate expectations to benefit from
this scheme.143 Germany defended the contested withdrawal by
arguing that it was necessary to avoid overcompensating biofuel
producers following the introduction of new regulatory
obligations, and changes in primary energy prices.144 The tax
exemption scheme was based on a former directive created to
promote the use of biofuels for transport145 and on the Council
Directive for the taxation of energy products.146 The latter
Directive explicitly entitles Member States to reconsider and
withdraw support to avoid overcompensation.147 The European
Court of Justice argued on this basis that:
[A] regulatory provision of this kind was . . . capable of
indicating at the outset to prudent and circumspect
economic operators that the tax exemption scheme
applicable to biofuels was liable to be adjusted or even
withdrawn by the national authorities in order to take
account of changes in certain external circumstances and
that, consequently, no certainty that such a scheme would

142. Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, Case C-201/08,
[2009] E.C.R. I-08343, ¶ 62.
143. Id. ¶¶ 20–30.
144. Id. ¶ 61.
145. See generally Council Directive 2003/30/EC on the Promotion of the Use of
Biofuels or Other Renewable Fuels for Transport, 2003 O.J. L 123/42 [hereinafter
Council Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Biofuels], invalidated by Council
Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 2009, O.J. L 140/16
[hereinafter Renewable Energy Sources Directive].
146. Restructuring the Community Framework Directive, supra note 141, at 52.
147. See id. art. 16(3), at 57.
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be maintained for a given period could be based on those
rules.148

Although the Plantanol case provides interesting guidance
on the application of the principle of legitimate expectations to
the withdrawal of support for low-carbon investments, its
relevance for claims under investment arbitration must be
considered with care. The threshold for violations of the
principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations under
EU law can be considered to be higher than the threshold for
breaches of fair and equitable treatment under international
investment law. Market players have only rarely succeeded in
convincing the Court of Justice that their expectations were
eviscerated.149 This can be explained by the fact that the court
often seems to require an explicit guarantee in the legislation
that measures would be maintained unchanged.150 In contrast,
arbitral tribunals, with the notorious exceptions of the awards in
Parkerings151 and AES,152 usually do not require explicit
stabilization guarantees to recognize the legitimacy of investors’
expectations.153 As mentioned before, legitimate expectations
are protected under the fair and equitable treatment standard
where states act to induce investments, and the resulting
arrangements constitute crucial elements in reliance of which
investors base their business case.154
Moreover, according to the Tecmed tribunal: “The investor
also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern
the actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with
the function usually assigned to such instruments.”155 The
“function usually assigned” to support schemes for renewable
148. Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, Case C-201/08,
[2009] E.C.R. I-08343, ¶ 62.
149. TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 268 (2d ed. 2006).
150. See, e.g., Vereniging voor Energie v. Directeur van de Dienst uitvoering en
toezicht energie, Case C-17/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-04983, ¶ 78.
151. Parkerings, supra note 123, ¶¶ 334–36.
152. See AES Summit Generation Ltd. & AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of
Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶¶ 9.3.25–.26 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 I.L.M.
186 (2011) [hereinafter AES]; see also Total, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 310–12 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://iatlaw.com/
documents/TotalvArgentina_DecisiononLiability.pdf [hereinafter Total].
153. AES, supra note 152, ¶ 9.3.25.
154. See generally Sempra, surpa note 125.
155. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 154.
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energy and to JI schemes is to stimulate low-carbon investments
by ensuring their financial viability.156 Substantial changes to
these schemes that would make it impossible for the concerned
installations to recover their investment costs and earn a
reasonable profit would thus be incompatible with the
fundamental function of these support instruments.157 Such
changes should therefore, in most cases, be considered as an
interference with investor expectations.
Wemaere and Streck argue that, as states seek to maintain
regulatory discretion over the GHG emission credits they create,
it appears necessary to protect investors against the “arbitrary
confiscation or discounting of these rights.”158 They further state
that “in the context of the implementation of JI projects, project
participants may legitimately expect to receive an amount of
ERUs corresponding to the verified emission reductions they
generated” by their investment.159 By the same token, renewable
energy investors can reasonably expect to benefit from the
support scheme to which they were entitled at the moment of
investing, for the period of time initially promised.160 National
regulations may, to a certain extent, limit these expectations.161
These regulations cannot, however, be interpreted so as to
totally nullify the rights of the investors that made their business
decisions relying on the implementation of support schemes.162
Waiver clauses, especially when formulated in broad and vague
terms,163 do not affect investors’ expectations to such an extent
as to allow their total destruction.164
156. IEA, supra note 2, at 293.
157. See also Total, supra note 152, ¶ 313.
158. See Wemaere & Streck, supra note 79, at 53; see also Boute, supra note 79, at
113.
159. Boute, supra note 79, at 113; see Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19.
160. See Boute, supra note 79, at 127; see also DE JAGER & RATHMANN, supra note
44, at 15–32, 119; DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, supra note 133, at 11–
12.
161. Boute, supra note 79, at 113; see Werksman, supra note 139, at 689–90; see also
Restructuring the Community Framework Directive, supra note 141, art. 16, at 57.
162. Boute, supra note 79, at 113.
163. In Russia, for instance, O Porjadke Utverzhdenija I Proverki Hoda Realizacii
Proektov, Osushhestvljaemyh v Sootvetstkvii so Stat’ej 6 Kiotskogo Protokola k
Ramochnoj Konvencii OON ob Izmenenii Kliamata [Decree No. 332, Government of
the Russian Federation, On the Procedure of Adopting and Monitoring the
Development of Projects Implemented Under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], 24(e) SOBRANIE
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D. National Treatment and Nondiscrimination
National treatment requires host states not to treat foreign
investors less favorably than national investors who are in a
comparable situation, unless such difference in treatment is
reasonably justified by public interest objectives.165 The
prohibition of discriminatory measures is not limited to
discrimination on the basis of nationality, but applies to all types
of difference in treatment.166 Could public interference with the
right of foreign investors to benefit from support schemes for
renewable energy or with their right to GHG emission credits
constitute an unjustified difference in treatment? This question
was at the heart of the Nykomb v. Latvia case.167
Nykomb claimed that Latvia had violated the national
treatment standard in the Energy Charter Treaty by refusing to
honor a promise of support for low-carbon electricity
production on the basis of which he made his investment.168 The
tribunal accepted Nykomb’s discrimination claim and ordered
Latvia to compensate his losses.169 Indeed, the tribunal observed
that the administrator of the support scheme continued to
support low-carbon installations operated by domestic investors,
while refusing this payment to a foreign investor, Nykomb,
operating in comparable conditions.170
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2007, No. 23, Item 2797, invalidated by O Merah po Realizacii Stat’ej 6
Kiotskogo Protokola k Ramochnoj Konvencii OON ob Izmenenii Kliamata [Decree No.
843, Government of the Russian Federation, On the Measures of Implementing the
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2009, No. 44, Item 5240, granted the
Russian Government almost unlimited discretion to withdraw support for projects even
after they were approved as eligible for such support. See ANNA KORPPOO & ARILD MOE,
RUSSIAN JI PROCEDURES: MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS? 6 (2007), available at
http://www.climatestrategies.org/reportfiles/russian_ji_procedures.pdf.
164. Boute, supra note 79, at 112.
165. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 179; Andrea K. Bjorklund,
National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 27, 29 (August Reinisch
ed., 2008).
166. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 176.
167. See generally Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Republic of Lat., SCC
Case No. 118/2001, Award (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2003) [hereinafter
Nykomb].
168. See id. ¶ 1.1.
169. See id. ¶ 4.3.2.
170. See id.
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The outcome of the Nykomb case is of considerable
importance for low-carbon investors. It illustrates the potential
protection that investment arbitration might offer against
illegitimate interference by the state with the financial and
regulatory basis of investments. Indeed, the Nykomb case is about
“bringing modern environmentally friendly and energy
efficient . . . technology
into
an
[obsolete]
electricity
industry.”171 It concerns a “green investor” that “finds his
investment based on a commitment to pay a double tariff
undermined because it is much cheaper for the state electricity
monopoly to purchase imported electricity produced without
any internalization of external costs.”172 The Nykomb award
demonstrates that IIAs “create rights for investors against a host
government for changing incentives and subsidies committed to
a foreign investor . . . [IIAs] enable[] a host state to make a
credible and internationally enforceable promise about
investment incentives and guarantees with respect to [lowcarbon] energy investment.”173
However, the protection of low-carbon investors under the
national treatment standard suffers from one important
limitation: states may not always change or withdraw support by
targeting international investors, but may introduce measures
that affect the support for all low-carbon investors, including
national investors.174 In case of a general refusal to observe
commitments of support, foreign investors could not rely on the
national treatment standard by arguing that this measure
“targeted Claimants’ investments specifically as foreign
investments.”175
E. Umbrella Clauses
Contractual relations are central to support schemes for
renewable energy and domestic schemes for the implementation
171. Wälde & Hobér, supra note 136, at 102–03.
172. Id.
173. Sussman, supra note 9, at 402.
174. See Boute, supra note 14, at 362.
175. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability, ¶ 147 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006) [hereinafter LG&E Energy Corp.];
see Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 180 (Oct.
12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf [hereinafter Noble Ventures].
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of the project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. As
mentioned above, these contracts concern the certification of
renewable energy installations and their eligibility to benefit
from support schemes. For JI and CDM projects, contractual
relations concern the approval of projects by the host state (e.g.
Letters of Approval). Contracts also govern the issuance and
transfer of GHG emission rights.
Umbrella clauses, also known as sanctity of contracts
clauses, in IIAs aim to guarantee by treaty the respect by the host
state for the specific obligations it enters into with investors (the
pacta sunt servanda principle).176 Could low-carbon investors
successfully invoke these clauses against breaches by the state of
the contractual obligations made to facilitate the
implementation of their investments? Arbitral tribunals and
commentators are divided on the scope of umbrella clauses.
These divisions reflect on the potential protection that these
clauses might offer to low-carbon investors.
The most contentious issue relates to the nature of the
obligations covered by these clauses.177 Some tribunals have
adopted a broad interpretation by considering that all
contractual obligations are protected by umbrella clauses.178
Others have refused to accord a broad scope to these clauses by
introducing a distinction between the “state as a sovereign” (acta
jure imperii) and the “state as a merchant” (acta jure gestionis).179
On the basis of this distinction, tribunals have declined to grant
176. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 153; MCLACHLAN, SHORE &
WEINIGER, supra note 76, at 92; Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause
in Investment Agreements 3 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l
Inv. No. 2006/3).
177. See Thomas Wälde, Contract Claims Under the Energy Charter Treaty’s Umbrella
Clause: Original Intentions Versus Emerging Jurisprudence, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 205 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006); Eric Teynier,
Umbrella Clauses: Le Temps se Couvre, GAZETTE DU PALAIS LES CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE
38 (2006/3).
178. See, e.g., Noble Ventures, supra note 175, ¶ 51; Eureko, supra note 88, ¶¶ 246–
48.
179. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jursidiction, ¶¶ 77–86 (Apr. 27, 2006), http://italaw.com/
documents/elpaso-jurisdiction27april2006.pdf [hereinafter El Paso]; Pan American
Energy LLC v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13 & BP America Production
Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ¶
108 (July 27, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdictioneng.pdf [hereinafter Pan American Energy].
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protection to an “ordinary commercial contract entered into by
the State.”180 These tribunals have therefore limited the scope of
umbrella clauses to additional investment protections
contractually agreed by the state in an investment agreement.181
The promotion of renewable energy and the reduction of
GHG emissions are objectives of public policy.182 The contracts
that states sign with investors to stimulate this kind of investment
are framed to pursue objectives of public interest.183 Arguably,
Letters of Approval of JI and CDM projects—where states
authorize the implementation of these GHG emission reduction
projects—involve the “state as a sovereign” rather than “the
state as a merchant.”184 Letters of Approval relate more to
investment agreements than to ordinary commercial
contracts.185 For JI projects, the host state takes the commitment
to issue and transfer the ERUs to the investor’s account.186 A
refusal by the state to transfer ERUs as agreed in a Letter of
Approval or in other agreements made with the investors could
thus amount to a breach of an umbrella clause.
A second point of debate concerns the application of the
rules of attribution to umbrella clauses. In accordance with the
rules of attribution, acts of separate entities are only attributable
to the state if it is shown that these entities exercise “puissance
publique (governmental authority) or acted on the instructions
of, or under the direction or control of, the State in carrying out
the conduct.”187 Is there a violation of the applicable IIA if a
legal entity separate from the central state has breached a
contractual obligation it had entered into with an investor?188
180. El Paso, supra note 179, ¶ 81.
181. See id.; see also Pan American Energy, supra note 179, ¶ 109.
182. See, e.g., Renewable Energy Sources Directive, supra note 145.
183. See ASSOCIATION OF ISSUING BODIES, supra note 81, at 8. Agreements for the
certification of renewable energy, for instance, pursue the public policy objective of
renewable energy development by improving confidence in the green certificates
mechanism and by ensuring the uniqueness of the certificates. Id.
184. But see Ratliff, supra note 35, at 390–91 (arguing that unilateral acts may be
viewed as acta jure gestionis).
185. Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19.
186. See id.
187. LLC Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award, ¶ 102
(Stockhold Chamber of Commerce 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/
AmtoAward.pdf.
188. See Anthony Sinclair, Bridging the Contract/Treaty Divide, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER
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Some arbitral tribunals have been reluctant to apply the
international rules of attribution to investment agreements.189
Other tribunals, such as the one in Noble Ventures v. Romania,
have accepted that contractual breaches by a separate public
entity can be attributed to the host state.190
Support schemes for renewable energy are often
administrated by entities that are separate from the state. In the
EU, for instance, Member States tend to charge independent
entities (e.g. network operators) with the administration of
support schemes in order to avoid qualification as state aid.191
Attribution to the state of contractual breaches by these separate
entities will eventually depend on the influence that the central
government exercised on the decision to breach the contract.
The attribution issue is more straightforward as it applies to
JI projects.192 Indeed, although separate entities from the state,
such as the Accredited Independent Entities, are involved in the
approval of JI projects and in the monitoring of emissions, the
main decisions are taken by the Focal Point and this is generally
part of the state apparatus (often the Ministry of Energy or the
Ministry of Environment).193 It is the Focal Point that will decide
on the conversion of the national AAUs to ERUs.194 It is also the

92, 101–02 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note
10, at 161–62.
189. See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/97/3,
Decision
on
Annulment,
¶
96
(July
3,
2002),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho
wDoc&docId=DC552_En&caseId=C159; see also Azurix Corp. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 384 (July 14, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC507_En&c
aseId=C5 [hereinafter Azurix]; Impregilo S.p.A v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 210–14 (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep.
245.
190. See Noble Ventures, supra note 175, ¶¶ 68–86.
191. According to the European Court of Justice, “only advantages granted
directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered aid.”
PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-2099, ¶ 58.
192. See Baetens, supra note 63, at 688.
193. Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol on Its First Session, Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference:
Addendum, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, Dec. 9/CMP.1, Annex D,
¶ 20(a) (Mar. 30, 2006).
194. See Streck, supra note 25, at 118.
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Focal Point that will decide on the transfer of the ERUs to the
account of the project participants.195
A third issue is whether the scope of umbrella clauses is
limited to investor–state contracts or if it extends to other
investment-related promises made by the host state.196 Many
arbitral tribunals accept a broad interpretation of the type of
“obligations” covered by umbrella clauses.197 A broad
interpretation will include commitments or promises made
unilaterally by host states in their domestic legislation as being
within the scope of umbrella clauses.198 However, not all legal
obligations resulting from the domestic regulatory framework
are protected under umbrella clauses.199 Arbitral tribunals
generally require that the obligations “must have been assumed
vis-à-vis the specific investment—not as a matter of the
application of some legal obligation of a general character.”200
Promises of support are investor specific. They are made visà-vis investors in renewable energy sources or, in the context of
JI projects, vis-à-vis investors in eligible GHG emission reduction
projects.201 It is therefore arguable that violations of legally
established commitments to support renewable energy or to
issue ERUs to approved JI projects could amount to a breach of
umbrella clauses.
F. Justification of Interference by Objectives of Public Policy?
The protection of an investor’s rights under international
arbitration is not absolute. Arbitral practice generally
195. Id.
196. See Stephan Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INTL L. 1, 84–93 (2009);
see also María Cristina Gritón Salias, Do Umbrella Clauses Apply to Unilateral Undertakings?,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 188, at 490, 490–91.
197. See Schill, supra note 196, at 90.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 121 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 518
(2005); see Continental Casualty Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 300 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/ContinentalCasualty
Award.pdf [hereinafter Continental Casualty Co.]; LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 175, ¶
174; Noble Ventures, supra note 175, ¶ 51.
201. See Streck, supra note 25, at 118–21.
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acknowledges a host state’s sovereign right to regulate.202 Could
host states successfully argue that the withdrawal or substantial
modification of support for low-carbon investments is reasonably
justified by objectives of public policy?
States could legitimately argue that they must have the right
to adapt the level and duration of support to avoid
overcompensating
low-carbon
investments.203
Overcompensation could occur following increases in the price
of electricity or following the internalization of the carbon
externality on the basis of a potential post-2012 international
agreement on climate change.204
However, states could also decide to withdraw or modify
support schemes to reduce public debt or to decrease energy
prices for consumers in advance of upcoming elections. This
would have the effect of imposing the financial burden of
climate policies on private investors. Under investment
arbitration, could such short-term policy (or populist) objectives
justify interference with low-carbon investors’ rights and
expectations?
Assessing an investor’s claim under the fair and equitable
treatment standard, the Saluka tribunal considered that:
No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally
unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of
the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and
reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to
regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be
taken into consideration as well.205

202. AES, supra note 152, ¶ 9.3.29; Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 305
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2006), 15 ICSID Rep. 274 (2010) [hereinafter Saluka];
Continental Casualty Co., supra note 200, at ¶ 258.
203. For an analysis of this issue in light of the principle of the protection of
legitimate expectations under EU law, see Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt
Darmstadt, Case C-201/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-08343, ¶¶ 53–68.
204. See, e.g., Restructuring the Community Framework Directive, supra note 141,
art. 16(3), at 57 (referring to overcompensation following changes in raw material
prices).
205. Saluka, supra note 202, ¶ 305; see Continental Casualty Co., supra note 200,
¶ 258; M.C.I. Power Group L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6,
Award, ¶ 278 (July 31, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/MCIEcuador_000.pdf.
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In determining a breach of the fair and equitable treatment
standard a tribunal is therefore required to weigh the investors’
legitimate and reasonable expectations against the legitimate
regulatory interests of the host state.
This balancing206 or proportionality207 test is unlikely to
affect the conclusion that substantial interference with the
commitments that states have made to attract low-carbon
investment violates the fair and equitable treatment standard.
Indeed, an assessment of alleged breaches of the fair and
equitable treatment standard will be more stringent where the
regulatory change affects specific conditions that the host state
offered to investors and where these conditions were
determinant for the investment decision.208 In the words of the
CMS tribunal:
It is not a question of whether the legal framework might
need to be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to
changing circumstances, but neither is it a question of
whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether
when specific commitments to the contrary have been
made.209

Arbitral tribunals also pay attention to public policy
objectives in the assessment of alleged violations of the
nondiscrimination standard. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, for
instance, the tribunal highlighted, in the context of the
comparison of foreign and domestic investors, that
“[d]ifferences in treatment will presumptively violate [the
national treatment obligation], unless they have a reasonable
nexus to rational government policies.”210 Differences in
treatment are thus justifiable if they pursue a public interest
objective.

206. Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing
and Delimiting a General Principle, 21 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVS. L.J. 1, 45–49 (2006).
207. Yannaca-Small, supra note 122, at 126–29.
208. See CMS Gas Transmission, supra note 105, ¶¶ 274–75.
209. Id. ¶ 277.
210. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 78–79
(NAFTA Arb. 2002), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinal
MeritsAward.pdf; see S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, ¶¶ 248, 250
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2000), http://italaw.com/documents/SDMeyers-1stPartial
Award.pdf.

650 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:613
In Nykomb v. Latvia, the tribunal decided that the host state
had failed to justify on the basis of public policy why it refused to
pay the promised support to the foreign investor, whilst
continuing to support national investors.211 It appears extremely
difficult for states to justify the necessity and proportionality of a
change to a support scheme that would only affect foreign
investors.212 However, states could more easily justify general
changes that equally affect domestic and foreign investors. The
public policy reasons that states could invoke are broad.
According to the recent award in AES, even purely political
actions taken to please the electorate in the context of
upcoming elections could qualify as reasonable objectives.213
Based on current arbitral practice, states could thus refer to
budgetary difficulties or consumer protection to legitimize the
general withdrawal of support schemes under the nondiscrimination standard.
A more controversial issue is to what extent host states’
right to regulate in the public interest (states’ “police powers”)
must be taken into account in the assessment of regulatory
measures under the expropriation standard.214 On the one
hand, according to the “sole effect” doctrine, which is followed
in certain awards, the effect of governmental action on the
investment is the preponderant and sole factor in assessing
whether there has been an expropriation.215 On the other hand,
many tribunals recognize a host state’s “police powers,” and take
them into account to justify the impact of these measures on
foreign investments.216 According to the Tecmed tribunal: “There
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the
211. Nykomb, supra note 167, ¶ 4.3.2.
212. See id.
213. AES, supra note 152, ¶ 10.3.22.
214. See Fortier & Drymer, supra note 96, at 317.
215. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mex. States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002); Compañía de Aguas del
Aconquija, supra note 77, ¶ 177; Azurix, supra note 189, ¶ 310.
216. See Saluka, supra note 202, ¶ 255; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final
Award, pt. IV, ch. D ¶ 7 (NAFTA Arb. 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/51052.pdf; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 122; LG&E
Energy Corp., supra note 175, ¶ 189; see also Walid Ben Hamida, La Prise en Compte de
L’intérêt Général et Des Impératifs de Développement dans le Droit des Investissements, 135 J. DU
DROIT INT’L 999, 999 (2008).
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aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”217 In
the application of the proportionality test, arbitral tribunals take
into account investors’ legitimate expectations218 and the degree
of deprivation imposed on investors’ rights. Measures that
completely and permanently annihilate investors’ expectations
and the economic value of their investment will rarely meet the
proportionality and reasonability criterion.219 According to
Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo: “In the extreme case of
complete and indefinite destruction of the economic value of
property by otherwise fully legitimate regulation, and if
individuals are required by regulation to make a special sacrifice
in terms of their proprietary rights for the benefit of the society
at large, compensation is . . . owed.”220
As mentioned above, the creation of specific rights and
expectations is central to support schemes for low-carbon
investments. Withdrawing support could lead to the destruction
of low-carbon investors’ rights and expectations to benefit from
support. It could place most financial costs of renewable energy
and GHG emission reduction policies on the private sector. If
arbitral tribunals would agree to assess support schemes
individually under the expropriation standard, it is arguable that
the destruction of investors’ rights of support would fail the
proportionality test and would therefore amount to an illegal
expropriation.
G. Preliminary Assessment
Existing investment standards have, in theory, the potential
to adequately protect investors in low-carbon projects against a
state’s refusal to honor the promises of support that they have
made to attract projects. In accordance with a certain arbitral
practice, withdrawal of support could be qualified as “partial
expropriation” of an investor’s regulatory and contractual
217. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 122; see LG&E Energy
Corp., supra note 175, ¶ 195; Azurix, supra note 189, ¶ 311.
218. See Snodgrass, supra note 206, at 1; see also Stephen Fietta, Expropriation and
the “Fair and Equitable” Standard: The Developing Role of Investors’ “Expectations” in
International Investment Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 375, 376 (2006).
219. Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection
and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 846 (2001).
220. Id.
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right(s) to receive the additional revenues that are necessary to
enable the financial viability of their investments. Substantial
changes to support schemes could amount to a violation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating an investor’s
legitimate expectation to benefit from support. Attempts by
states to impose the major costs of climate policies on foreign
investors could be considered to be discriminatory. Moreover,
umbrella clauses could provide additional guarantees against
breaches of contractual or regulatory commitments made to
facilitate low-carbon investments. If the impact on investors’
rights and expectations is sufficiently serious, states could hardly
justify reneging on their promises of support by advancing
public policy objectives, such as budgetary constraints or shortterm economic harm.
Arbitral tribunals have, however, followed diverging
interpretations of the existing investment standards.221 This
divergence results firstly from different formulations of
investment standards in the IIAs applicable to the dispute. It also
can be explained by the importance of the specific
circumstances in each case.222 More importantly, investment
arbitration does not know a doctrine of precedent.223 In
accordance with Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, an
award is binding on the parties.224 Future arbitral tribunals can
interpret the applicable IIA differently and apply it to the
specific facts of the case according to their own appreciation.225
The result is a “trend of diverging—and sometimes
conflicting—awards,” as well as a “lack of coherence, consistency
and predictability.”226 Low-carbon investors thus have no
221. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Latest Developments in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: IIA Issues Note No. 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3, at
12 (2010) [hereinafter IIA Issues Note No. 1].
222. On the importance of the circumstances of the case at hand, see DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 128, and Fortier & Drymer, supra note 96, at 306.
223. The absence of a doctrine of precedent has been repeatedly confirmed by
arbitral tribunals. For the relevant awards, see Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and
Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 3 TRANSNAT’L. DISP.
MGMT. 1, 10–15 (2006), available at www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/cspubl_85.pdf.
224. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, supra note 64, art. 53(1).
225. See id.
226. IIA Issues Note No. 1, supra note 221, at 12; see World Investment Report 2010,
supra note 137, at 137.
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certainty that arbitral tribunals will follow an interpretative
approach that will adequately protect them against public
interference with the financial and regulatory basis of their
investments. The limits of the protection offered by existing IIAs
raise the question of the necessity to create a specific investment
regime for low-carbon investments.
III. AN INVESTMENT REGIME FOR CLIMATE INVESTMENTS
Analysts have identified a negative correlation between a
state’s potential for GHG emission reductions and the quality of
their investment climate.227 In a comparative study on the
attractiveness of different countries as hosts for JI projects,
Samuel Fankhauser and Lucia Lavric consider that:
JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for
cheap JI on the one hand and the quality of JI institutions
and the business environment on the other. The countries
with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions
also tend to be the countries with the most difficult
investment climate.228

This negative correlation can be explained by the fact that
investment instability and unpredictability would deter the
inflow of capital and the transfer of technology necessary to
modernize and thus reduce the carbon intensity of the
economy. In contrast, countries with a stable investment
environment would attract private investments to contribute
towards the modernization and improved energy efficiency of
the state’s economy.229 There are less so-called “low-hanging

227. See Samuel Fankhauser & Lucia Lavric, The Investment Climate for Climate
Investment: Joint Implementation in Transition Countries (Eur. Bank for Reconstr. & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 77, 2003), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/
economics/workingpapers/wp0077.pdf; see also Maria Garbuzova & Reinhard
Madlener, Towards an Efficient and Low-Carbon Economy Post-2012: Opportunities and
Barriers for Foreign Companies in the Russian Market 2 (Inst. for Future Energy Consumer
Needs & Behavior, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), available at http://www.eonerc.rwthaachen.de/global/show_document.asp?id=aaaaaaaaaacggaz (“Unstable legal and
economic conditions in different markets impede the realization of long-term energy
efficiency and carbon mitigation projects.”).
228. Fankhauser & Lavric, supra note 227, at 26.
229. See Fankhauser & Lavric, supra note 227, at 22 (arguing that “the countries
with the worst investment climate will have attracted the lowest amount of (foreign or
domestic) investment. Such investments generally increase resource efficiency and
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fruits” in terms of energy efficiency improvements and GHG
emission reductions in these stable economies.230
Kati Kulovesi, arguing along the same line, highlights the
positive effect that a stable and secure investment climate has on
the attractiveness of a country from an investor’s perspective for
the implementation of the project-based mechanisms of the
Kyoto Protocol.231 Kulovesi considers that “[CDM and JI]
projects tend to concentrate on the most advanced developed
countries
with
conducive
and
secure
investment
environments.”232 These findings are supported by Sonja
Peterson’s analysis, who determined that “[h]ost countries of
CDM and JI projects are to date often those countries that also
receive a significant proportion of total FDI flows.”233
To improve the general investment climate for low-carbon
investments, analysts have proposed the integration of
investment protection rules in a post-2012 international
agreement on climate change.234 Just like the Energy Charter
Treaty, which aims to stimulate investments in the energy field
by providing investment protection guarantees to private
investors,235 the Kyoto Protocol could encompass an investment
regime that would protect low-carbon investments against
noncommercial risks.236 The International Institute for

upgrade the capital stock: actions that usually lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions”).
230. See id.
231. See Kulovesi, supra note 19, at 150.
232. Id.
233. Sonja Peterson, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Developing Countries Through
Technology Transfer?: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 13 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 283, 300 (2008).
234. See Rethinking Climate Change as a Sustainable Investment Regime, INT’L INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/investment/research/crosscutting.aspx
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Rethinking Climate Change]; see also Baetens,
supra note 63, at 714; Anatole Boute, Combating Climate Change and Securing Electricity
Supply: The Role of Investment Protection Law, 16 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 248 (2007);
Harro Van Asselt et al., Advancing the Climate Agenda: Exploiting Material and Institutional
Linkages to Develop a Menu of Policy Options, 14 REV. EC & INT’L ENVTL. L. 255, 262
(2005).
235. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 11, at 14. See generally Andrew
Seck, Investing in the Former Soviet Union’s Oil Industry: The Energy Charter Treaty and Its
Implications for Mitigating Political Risk, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST
GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 110 (Thomas W. Wälde ed., 1996).
236. See Rethinking Climate Change, supra note 234.
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Sustainable Development (“IISD”), for instance, defended the
view that:
The Kyoto Protocol . . . is an obvious candidate for the
addition of investment rules designed to promote
sustainable energy investment. IISD can foresee the climate
change regime evolving, at least in part, into an investment
regime, aimed at stimulating investment in technology
renewal and industrial transformation with a view to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.237

There are, however, nonnegligible barriers to the
transformation of the Kyoto Protocol into a multilateral
investment treaty. International climate negotiators are already
confronted with the complex task of agreeing on the basic
elements of a post-2012 regime, such as GHG emission cuts,
monitoring procedures, and new financing mechanisms.238
According to Edna Sussman, “[a] suggestion that these
negotiators also address is the issue of how to craft an acceptable
multi-lateral investment treaty that is simply not practical.”239
Instead, Sussman argues that:
[T]he ECT presents a readymade investment protection
treaty already ratified by over fifty nations. It is this treaty
that the developing nations should be urged to adopt as an
important contribution on their part to arresting climate
change, in the absence of GHG emission reduction caps
binding on them.240

It is true that many states characterized as having “lowhanging fruits” in terms of GHG emission reductions are not
contracting parties to the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia, for
instance, has an enormous potential for GHG emission
reductions241 and presents considerable opportunities for the

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
See Sussman, supra note 9, at 402–03.
Id.
Id.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION & THE WORLD BANK GROUP, ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA: UNTAPPED RESERVES 68 (2008), available at http://www.ifc.org/
ifcext/rsefp.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/FINAL_EE_report_Engl.pdf/$FILE/
Final_EE_report_engl.pdf [hereinafter ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA].
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development of renewable energy sources.242 It signed the
Energy Charter Treaty, but refused to ratify it.243 Future climate
change mitigation and renewable energy investments in Russia,
therefore, are not protected under the Energy Charter Treaty.
In line with Sussman’s argument, there can be no doubt that
Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty or a similar
multilateral energy treaty would considerably improve the
investment climate for low-carbon projects.
However, as Russia’s reluctance to endorse the Energy
Charter Treaty illustrates, this treaty has proved to be
particularly sensitive for energy-producing countries. Given
relatively cheap access to energy resources, energy producers are
often characterized by an energy and carbon intensity.244 These
countries have an enormous potential for energy savings and
GHG emission reductions. Advocating the adoption of the
Energy Charter Treaty as a solution to the investment instability
that affects low-carbon projects will therefore face resistance
from some of the most relevant hosts of these projects.
More importantly, the Energy Charter Treaty and existing
IIAs in general do not provide low-carbon investors with a clear
and certain guarantee of protection against the risks of
interference by the state with the financial and regulatory basis
of their investments. As analyzed above, existing investment
protection standards theoretically could shield low-carbon
investors from regulatory changes or ex post public
interventions that represent a real threat to the financial viability
of their investments. However, given diverging interpretations
amongst the arbitral tribunals, there can be no absolute
guarantee that the conditions underpinning climate change
mitigation investments will be honored.

242. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLES IN RUSSIA: FROM
OPPORTUNITY TO REALITY (2003), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/
renew_in_russiaSUM.pdf.
243. See Rasporjazhenie Pravitel’stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 30 Ijulja 2009 g. N
1055-r [Decree No. 1055-r, Government of the Russian Federation, Decision on the
Energy Charter], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2009, No. 32, Item 4053.
244. Russia illustrates the fact that many energy producers often tend to be energy
and carbon intensive. See ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA, supra note 241, at 68; see also
Jonathan Stern, The Russian Gas Balance to 2015: Difficult Years Ahead, in RUSSIAN AND
CIS GAS MARKETS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EUROPE 54, 75 (Simon Pirani ed., 2009).

2012]

COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE

657

Accordingly, there appears to be a need to assure lowcarbon investors that arbitral tribunals will apply investment
standards in a way that offers adequate protection against the
specific risks that may affect their investments. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 2010 World
Investment Report on Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy
recommends: “Policy makers could devise IIA language that
strengthens the role of IIAs in helping attract low-carbon
foreign investment and encouraging the diffusion of relevant
technology.”245 This could be done by fine-tuning the existing
IIAs, for instance by means of common interpretative
statements, or by integrating a specific low-carbon investment
regime in a future international agreement on climate change.
The creation of such a specific low-carbon investment
regime will not require the negotiators to develop new
investment disciplines. To improve the stability of the
investment climate for low-carbon projects, it would suffice to
crystallize the interpretation applied by certain arbitral tribunals
on existing investment standards that already provide
considerable protection against the risks that characterize
climate policies. This could be done in the following ways:
First, a low-carbon investment regime should officially
endorse the qualification created by the Eureko tribunal of
specific rights as “investments” that can be individually
protected under international investment law. Given that under
current market conditions the financial viability of low-carbon
investments depends on public support, the right to receive this
support constitutes “a key element of the investment, without
which it appears that there would have been no investment at
all.”246 This right has “some economic value.”247 It should
therefore be entitled to individual investment protection.
Substantial modifications to, or even withdrawal of, the support
245. World Investment Report 2010, supra note 137, at 137; see ENERGY CHARTER
SECRETARIAT, ROAD MAP FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE ENERGY CHARTER PROCESS 7
(2010), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/
Road_Map_ENG.pdf; Daniel M. Firger, The Coming Harmonization of Climate Change
Policy and International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 37 (2011),
available
at
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/print/Firger_May_9_2011_
FINAL.pdf.
246. Eureko, supra note 88, ¶ 145.
247. Id.
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that existed at the moment of investment should amount to
measures tantamount to expropriation. Some support
mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, might
not be capable of “independent economic exploitation” because
of the impossibility to sell these support mechanisms
independently from the underlying electricity transaction.248
This could jeopardize the qualification of these rights as an
individual investment and make it more difficult to rule that
interference with this right constitutes an indirect
expropriation. For this reason, the right to benefit from support
for renewable energy and GHG emission reduction projects
should be explicitly included in the definition of “investments”
in IIAs. This definition could specify that low-carbon
investments benefit from individual protection under the treaty,
independently from the impact on the overall investment. The
“unbundling” of property rights249 should be officially endorsed
for low-carbon investments that base their business case on
public support.
Second, a specific low-carbon investment regime should
adopt the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment
standard outlined by the Tecmed tribunal. This interpretation
states that host states must “use the legal instruments that
govern the actions of the investor or the investment in
conformity with the function usually assigned to such
instruments.”250 Building further on this approach, the fair and
equitable treatment standard should guarantee to investors that
host states will apply the mechanisms that they developed to
induce investments in conformity with the ordinary use of these
mechanisms. Ex post interference with support mechanisms,
which prevent companies that invested in reliance on them from
recovering their costs, contradicts the “function usually assigned
to” these support mechanisms.

248. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM
THE COMMISSION, SEC(2008) 57, THE SUPPORT OF ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES: ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENT TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON
THE PROMOTION OF THE USE OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 5 (2008).
249. SORNARAJAH, supra note 91, at 371–72.
250. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 154.
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Third, in line with the arbitral award in Noble Ventures,251 the
scope of umbrella clauses in a low-carbon investment regime
should not be limited to contracts concluded by the central
state, but should include undertakings made by separate public
entities. Similarly, violations of the fair and equitable treatment
standard by separate agencies should be attributable to the host
state. Such a clarification of the application of the rules of
attribution does not mean that the state would have to assume
liability for every breach of “commercial” obligations by these
separate entities. It would, however, ensure that, when
regulatory tasks are delegated to separate entities, a violation by
these entities of their obligations entails a violation of the
investment treaty. Such a guarantee is particularly relevant in
the context of the administration of support schemes for
renewable energy. As illustrated by the European experience,
states tend to delegate important regulatory tasks to separate
entities in order to avoid the qualification of support schemes as
state aid. By virtue of this delegation and of the nature of the
delegated tasks, it can be said that these entities exercise
sovereign competences. A violation of the undertakings taken
on the basis of these competences should be attributable to the
state.
IV. THE CLIMATE LAW—INVESTMENT LAW SYNERGY
The central importance of private investors to national and
international climate change mitigation efforts necessitates the
integration of their basic concerns in the regulatory initiatives
developed to tackle climate change. The lack of internalization
of the carbon externality is not the only obstacle to the
development of low-carbon investments. The regulatory risks in
the mechanisms that states create to internalize the carbon
externality are as relevant to private investors. An efficient
regulatory approach to climate change mitigation therefore
must reflect and address investors’ concerns about regulatory
stability and predictability.252
Providing guarantees of regulatory stability and
predictability is controversial because it involves a limitation of
251. See Noble Ventures, supra note 175, ¶¶ 68–86.
252. STERN, supra note 6, at 19.
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states’ regulatory space. This limitation, by definition, is “a
necessary corollary to the objective of creating an investmentfriendly climate.”253 If states want to increase the credibility of
their political commitments, they must accept being bound by
them in the future.254
By signing and ratifying IIAs, states have recognized that
regulatory stability and predictability influence investment
decisions. They have accepted binding external constraints to
attract foreign capital and technology. However, the limitation
of states’ regulatory space is also one of the most contentious
issues in the international investment law discipline. The
literature repeatedly has stressed how binding investment
obligations could affect a state’s regulatory space and policy
liberty. Regarding climate change mitigation, commentators
have warned that foreign investors in energy intensive
installations could invoke investment protection standards
against the implementation of national and international GHG
emission reduction policies. They have criticized the effect of
“regulatory chill” that investment arbitration would represent
for states that intend to impose emission reductions, and have
proposed ways to avoid investment arbitration clashing with
climate policies.
The focus on the potential constraining effect of
investment arbitration has taken attention away from the
potential positive contribution that investment law could make
to combat climate change. Analyses on the interaction between
investment law and climate change mitigation have been limited
by a vision of foreign investors as polluters that aim to take
advantage of, and even abuse, basic “rule of law” guarantees.
Obsessed with the popular “mythology of ‘green communities’
opposed by ‘greedy and environmentally lax’ investors,”255
analysts have largely ignored the fact that private capital and
technology are indispensable to reorient the world economy
towards more climate-friendly patterns.

253. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 9.
254. Michael Grubb & David Newbery, Pricing Carbon for Electricity Generation:
National and International Dimensions, in DELIVERING A LOW-CARBON ELECTRICITY
SYSTEM: TECHNOLOGIES, ECONOMICS AND POLICY, supra note 135, at 278, 300.
255. Wälde & Hobér, supra note 136, at 103.
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Investment arbitration, as an “externally supported
committed device,”256 has the potential to neutralize the risks
that characterize low-carbon investments. It provides the
conceptual tools that are necessary to complement the existing
income-based approach with a risk-based approach. By doing so,
it can reinforce the credibility, and thus effectiveness, of
national and international climate policies.
Climate law and investment law are complementary and
mutually reinforcing. Both disciplines aim to promote
investments by adopting a different approach. The fundamental
objective of both is to attract private capital, especially of foreign
origin, and to stimulate the transfer of technology to developing
countries and economies in transition. To achieve this objective,
climate law creates incentives to enable the financial viability of
low-carbon investments. Investment law, on the other hand,
aims to promote investment by protecting it against
noncommercial risk.
The complementary character of climate and investment
law is not limited to the fact that they both aim to promote
investment. It also results from the comparable principles that
have been developed under climate and investment law to attain
this objective.
The principles of climate law and investment law are
complementary first because of the central role of investors’
expectations in these two fields of law. Under climate law,
support schemes for the promotion of low-carbon investments
aim to attract investors on the basis of promises of support.
States thus create expectations in reliance of which low-carbon
investors commit capital and transfer technology. The
international investment law principle of fair and equitable
treatment, on the other hand, is directed at protecting foreign
investors against eviscerations by states of the expectations they
have created to attract investors. Climate law thus creates
expectations, while investment law protects them.
Second, the principles of climate law and investment law
are complementary in the creation and protection of property
256. Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:
Correlation Versus Causation 5 (Mar. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Munich University Library, Munich Personal RePEc Archive), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2255/1/MPRA_paper_2255.pdf.

662 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:613
rights. On the one hand, support schemes for low-carbon
investments entitle investors to additional financial revenues.
These schemes create contractual and regulatory rights for
investors to benefit from support during a certain period of
time. On the other hand, the expropriation standard under
international investment law protects investors against measures
that destroy the economic value of investments, including
contractual and regulatory rights.
Third, both climate law and investment law recognize
contractual relations between the state and investors as the
foundation of investment decisions. Under climate law,
contractual rights are created to facilitate the investment
process. Under investment law, contractual rights are protected
against state interference in order to guarantee the stability of
investment conditions.
Climate law and investment law are thus based on
comparable principles that they approach from different
perspectives. Climate law follows an income-based approach,
while investment law adopts a risk-based focus. Climate law
creates rights and expectations, while investment law aims to
protect them. The creation and protection of investors’
expectations and rights can be seen as the logical corollary of
the general objective of investment promotion that these two
fields of law pursue. By providing a conceptual alternative to the
current unilateral income-based approach in climate law,
investment law has the potential to make a significant
contribution to the national and international efforts at
combating climate change.
IIAs, however, are not environmental treaties.257 They are
part of the context of globalization and economic liberalization,
and are thus not directly designed to stimulate low-carbon
investments.258 According to Thomas Wälde, most existing IIAs

257. Peter Cameron considers, for instance, that “[t]he ECT is . . . almost
explicitly not an environmental treaty and contains only a short provision on the
subject in Article 19 and a separate protocol on energy efficiency.” PETER D. CAMERON,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY 203 (2010).
258. As an exception, the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Japan and
Switzerland explicitly refers to the promotion of energy efficiency and climate change
mitigation in its preamble. See World Investment Report 2010, supra note 137, at 137.
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focus on “traditional political risk.”259 They do not explicitly aim
to address the specific risks that characterize low-carbon
projects.
The Nykomb case has highlighted the potential relief that
investment law might offer to a low-carbon investor who is
confronted with a regulatory change affecting the financial basis
of his project. It is, however, not sufficiently representative to
support the general conclusion that investment standards in
existing IIAs, as interpreted in the current arbitral practice,
provide adequate protection against the risks that can affect lowcarbon investments. In casu the violation of investment law was
particularly blatant. The host state withdrew the support scheme
for the foreign investor, while it continued to support domestic
players. Low-carbon investors might yet face much subtler state
interference with the public support commitments that
underpin their investment decisions. The protection that
existing IIAs might offer in these cases is less evident. While the
interpretation of investment standards, by some arbitral
tribunals, could force states to honor their promises of support,
other less favorable approaches cannot be excluded. In the
absence of a doctrine of precedent, investment arbitration
provides no certainty to low-carbon investors that the financial
and regulatory basis of their investment will be respected.
However, it is precisely this certainty that is needed to
facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Existing
interpretations that provide adequate protection to low-carbon
investments therefore should be officially endorsed in IIAs, or
be integrated in a specific investment regime for low-carbon
investments.
CONCLUSION
Investment arbitration has the potential to considerably
limit the instability that currently affects the implementation of
climate change mitigation policies. By limiting regulatory risks—
and thus risk premiums—for low-carbon investments,
investment protection law can reduce the costs of the
international GHG emission reduction efforts. The contribution
259. Thomas Wälde, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment, 34 J.
WORLD TRADE 1, 14 (2000).
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of investment arbitration to the improved regulatory certainty of
low-carbon investments will, however, depend on the certainty
of the arbitral process itself. The ongoing negotiations on the
conclusion of a post-2012 international agreement on climate
change provide a unique opportunity to address these investors’
concerns and create a special investment regime for low-carbon
investments.

